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Abstract
Technology companies like Apple pride themselves on protecting its consumers’ data,
which they express within their mission statement and by also encrypting their mobile
devices. This encryption stalled an investigation conducted by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation in 2016, resulting in them taking Apple to court. There has been a lack of
information about mobile forensic examiners perceptions on issue they face in the mobile
forensic field. The purpose of this research study was to address the perceptions mobile
forensic examiners experience when dealing with encryption, privacy, and national
security concerns. This qualitative phenomenological study included interviews with 10
mobile forensic examiners (two female and eight male) with at least 1 year of experience
on key issues in the mobile forensic field. Results from this study, identified that mobile
forensic examiners wanted to work with technology companies on encryption issues,
however they did not have a solution on how to begin. Findings from this study can be
used to move forward the conversation between the technology companies and mobile
forensic examiners, in order to come to an understanding with each other, with a
comprise everyone can live with. Future research can gather information on how the
technology companies perceive the privacy and encryption concerns, resulting in positive
social change.
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study
Introduction
The purpose of this qualitative research study was to understand the barriers
criminal investigators face when conducting mobile forensics investigations. While
considering such barriers, security and privacy were also researched in terms of national
security and mobile forensics. Cultural differences between law enforcement and tech
companies were acknowledged when considering national security and privacy. One-onone interviews with forensic examiners and criminal investigators as well as individuals
from the private sector with different backgrounds helped fill a gap in research involving
individuals’ perceptions concerning mobile forensics security and privacy. This helped in
terms of addressing the importance of law enforcement perceptions regarding how they
feel about barriers when mobile forensics meets national security and privacy at the same
time.
Background
In 2016, The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) responded to an active
shooter incident in San Bernardino, CA. Upon responding to the incident and the shooter
being fatally shot, agents wanted to gain access to the suspect iPhone. The FBI attempted
to work with Apple to gain access via a backdoor, however Apple refused to help, stating
privacy and security concerns if they created a backdoor to the device. This resulted in
the FBI taking Apple to court, attempting to force them to work with them, by citing
national security concerns. During the Apple v. FBI case, it was clear that there was a
lack of standards pertaining to national security, privacy, and mobile forensics. The court
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did not get a chance to rule on whether Apple needed to create a back door for the FBI to
access the device, as the FBI decided to drop the case prematurely and find alternative
routes to get the information they needed. There is information concerning why mobile
forensics is a method for law enforcement conducting investigations; however, there is a
lack of information concerning costs of mobile forensics when considering privacy and
national security. This is an issue that will get worse until the matter is addressed.
Problem Statement
The criminal justice system has an enduring issue that has never been properly
resolved. That issue involves the amount of privacy citizens expect when it comes to their
media equipment and criminal investigations conducted by law enforcement. According
to Levy (2017), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) devalues privacy rights by
coveting Apple’s security features to get into possible suspect iPhones. In 2016, an active
shooter incident in San Bernardino, California demonstrated the amount of pressure and
limits preventing law enforcement agencies from getting access to individuals’ personal
devices in order to obtain what may be incriminating evidence. Mobile devices can hold a
plethora of information on them to include calls logs, pictures, passwords, GPS data,
system files and deleted data (Gillware, n.d.).
According to the Interagency Security Committee (ISC, 2015), there were over
160 active shooter incidents with 1,043 casualties between 2000 and 2013. Law
enforcement serves as a form of protection to the public from those who have committed
horrendous acts of crime. Companies were formerly against encryption security measures
in their products; however, this has drastically changed over time, and now they are
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refusing to not encrypt their products, causing concern for law enforcement agencies
(Hosein, 2017). There is a lot of discussion on the topic; however, there is a lack of
information regarding how individuals outside the tech and law enforcement field feel
about the issue and how they perceive it. According to Makin and Morczek (2015),
telecommunication providers can supply investigators with voice mail, call logs, and
codes for accessing data contained on subscriber identity modules (SIM); however, those
same companies can make it extremely difficult to trace communication because of legal
processes that are potentially required. There is a lack of guidance throughout the
criminal justice field in terms of what procedures and processes need to take place for
investigators to conduct their investigations, especially when concerning mobile
forensics. According to Cisco (2016), there were 11.6 billion mobile-connected devices
in the year 2020. This study will fill the gap of lack of communication and understanding
mobile forensic examiners and technology companies currently have amongst each other.
Expanding and contributing to the body of knowledge needed to address this problem by
addressing what the public, tech companies, and government agencies can do to discuss
the issue with a possible compromise between security and privacy.
Purpose
The purpose of this qualitative research study was to understand barriers criminal
investigators face when conducting mobile forensics investigations. While considering
such barriers, security and privacy were also researched in terms of national security and
mobile forensics. Focusing mainly on mobile forensics investigations, culture differences
between law enforcement and the public were acknowledged when considering national
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security and privacy. One-on-one interviews with forensic examiners and criminal
investigators as well as individuals from the private sector with different backgrounds
helped fill gaps in research where individuals’ perceptions concerning mobile forensics
security and privacy had been vague. This helped in terms of acknowledging the
importance of forensic examiners’ perceptions regarding how they felt about barriers
involving mobile forensics meeting national security and privacy issues at the same time.
Research Questions
RQ1: What is the impact of encryption on mobile forensic investigations?
RQ2: When considering national security, what are the perceptions of mobile
forensic investigators concerning privacy rights?
Framework
The theoretical approach for this research study was Husserl’s phenomenology
theory in which he focused on ideas. The phenomenology theory has been used
throughout multiple studies involving individuals’ perceptions regarding incidents they
have lived to experience. As forensic examiners have lived numerous experiences where
they have dealt with encryption on mobile devices and had difficulty cracking the
encryption, using this theory will help in terms of addressing their thoughts on the issue.
Husserl’s phenomenology theory involves the perceptions of individuals.
According to Smith (2016), phenomenology involves developing a descriptive or analytic
psychology in that it describes and analyzes types of subjective mental activity or
experiences. Blasdel (2010) said the purpose of using the phenomenological approach is
to identify common themes.
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. The phenomenology theory involves researchers including and reflecting on
their own experiences in ways that elicit deeper and more profound participant responses
(Miner-Romanoff, 2012). As a researcher, reflecting on personal experiences can in many
ways be a potential weakness of this theory, as it may sway participants’ responses based
of how questions are presented. Alawadhi (2019) said “researchers must aim to remove
theory from the description of the phenomenon, or to bracket perceived notions and
prejudices” (p. 79).
Nature of the Study
The nature of this research study was qualitative. Use of the qualitative approach
allowed for perceptions of mobile forensic examiners to be coded and analyzed for
potential themes. These themes were used to understand if there were potential patterns
that existed when considering mobile forensics, privacy, and national security. Using an
inductive approach, I analyzed themes from participants’ interviews to gain a generalized
understanding. In order to understand barriers that mobile forensic examiners face when
trying to conduct criminal investigations, Husserl’s phenomenology theory was applied.
These barriers were discussed with forensic examiners, which may contrast with how
tech companies may feel about the same issues.
Definitions
Acquisition: The process of making a forensic image from computer media such
as a hard drive, thumb drive, CD-ROM, removable hard drives, servers, and other media
that stores electronic data including gaming consoles and other devices (Universal Data
Acquisition, n.d).
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Digital Forensics: The process of preservation, identification, extraction, and
documentation of computer evidence which can be used in a court of law.
Encryption: The process of changing plain text into random characters that only
can only be decoded with the right passcodes.
Federal Forensic Examiner: Examiners who work at the federal government
level, instead of state and local levels.
Imaging: Copying a physical storage device for conducting investigations and
gathering evidence (Griffin, 2018).
Mobile Forensics: A branch of digital forensics which involves acquisition and
the analysis of mobile devices to recover digital evidence of investigative interest (Dcng,
2015).
Mobile Forensic Examiner: A forensic examiner who tends to specialize in
mobile devices such as smartphones.
Assumptions
This study assumed that individuals participating in this study felt very strong
about mobile forensics being an important field in digital forensics, especially when
concerning criminal investigations, therefor their perceptions on what effects the field is
important too. As participants use mobile forensics regularly to solve criminal
investigations, they are not the decision makers when it comes to the scope of
information they are allowed to collect or not. However, it was assumed that they were in
position to best help decision makers understand the importance of mobile forensics and
why sometimes individuals’ privacy may have been violated.
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As forensic examiners often have some discretion when it involves mobile
forensic investigations, it can be difficult to assume whether or not information retrieved
in this investigation were rightly retrieved or viewed. This is important to acknowledge as
privacy is one of the focal issues within this research study.
Scope and Delimitations
The study involved using interviews to understand participants’ perceptions
regarding privacy and mobile forensics. Data was collected form a small participant
group who were available to speak via video chat and had at least 1 year of experience
with mobile forensics. As mobile forensics is a very specialized field, participants were
expected to be technical inclined, as I was not planning to explain the field of mobile
forensics. In order to address the potential of transferability, themes were compared to
research concerning computer forensic encryption issues. There was a lack of scholarly
research available to draw from regarding mobile forensic examiners perceptions on
encryption, privacy, and national security. Detailed emails were sent to all participants
who agreed to interviews, therefor ensuring every participant understood what they were
agreeing to.
Limitations
Only certain mobile forensic examiners who had at least a year of experience
were interviewed, as it would be impractical to speak with mobile forensic examiners
who lack real experience in the field. This also created some limitations and bias because
individuals with less than a year of experience could still potentially have provided
valuable information. These limitations and biases were addressed by having a mix of
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individuals participate who were randomly selected via social media and had different
backgrounds in the field.
Significance
This study helped fill in gaps regarding many issues law enforcement and mobile
forensic examiners face when dealing with national security and privacy. Most federal
law enforcement depend on evidence found on individuals’ personal devices when
conducting investigations. With the current issue of security and privacy overlapping one
another, there must be clear standards in order to protect everyone involved. Focusing on
barriers that come along with mobile forensics and privacy, this study will afford policy
makers the opportunity to see, understand, and address these barriers that law
enforcement investigators feel could hinder them from conducting mobile forensic
investigations and still maintain privacy for individuals. This research study contributed
to discussions regarding technology companies and law enforcement concerning building
back doors to mobile devices, especially when national security may be of concern.
Summary
In this chapter, I discussed the purpose and background of this study, while also
acknowledging a gap in research concerning digital forensics. While addressing this gap,
I also address the limitations that the study may face. The assumption that mobile
forensics was one of the most important aspects of criminal investigation was also
discussed. Definitions of terminology used throughout research were listed In Chapter 2,
I address mobile forensics and the process of conducting examinations along with
previous laws that have been established concerning privacy and electronic devices. I will
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also discuss relevant research studies concerning issues technology companies and
forensic examiners face dealing with encryption methods.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
Introduction
This study will provide a deeper understanding of participants’ perceptions based
on previous issues concerning mobile forensics in criminal investigations. There is a lack
of research available regarding mobile forensics and encryption when it comes to
investigations and how encryption plays a major role in examiners being able to conduct
their examinations in a thorough and timely manner. Information was compiled from
sources such as legal documents, news articles, and interviews with professionals in the
field.
These sources focused on experiences individuals had, or situations that
happened. According to Moustakas (1994), “phenomenology is focused less on the
interpretations of the researcher and more on a description of the experiences of
participants” (p. 165). Using the phenomenology theory, I was able to gain understanding
of the concerns forensic examiners have when attempting to conduct their investigations
in a timely manner. Thanh and Thanh (2015) said researchers who use the interpretivist
paradigm and qualitative methods often seek experiences, understandings, and
perceptions of individuals for their data to uncover reality rather than rely on numbers or
statistics.
While the purpose of this study is to gain a better understanding of why privacy
and mobile forensics can sometimes cause concerns for individuals, this study also
involves different aspects of mobile forensics and privacy rights. Along with researching
mobile forensics, this study also addressed different aspects of forensics such as digital
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evidence. Using the Fourth Amendment and notable Supreme Court cases, this chapter
includes information regarding how mobile forensics is becoming a gray area that will
eventually need to be addressed as the field is continues to grow and expand.
Criminal investigations are constantly being subverted by digital evidence and
anything digital can store evidence within it. This has created an unprecedented issue in
the criminal justice and law enforcement fields, especially when it relates to mobile and
smartphones. As these devices continue to advance, individuals’ privacy continues to be
discussed.
Interpretivism
When considering research on the perception of mobile forensics examiners,
utilizing an interpretivist philosophy would be ideal. Dudovskiy (n.d.) said interpretivism
is “associated with the philosophical position of idealism, and is used to group together
diverse approaches, including phenomenology; an approach that reject the objectivist
view that meaning resides within the world independently of consciousness” (Dudovskiy,
n.d, as cited in Collins, 2010). When discussing individuals’ privacy, it can often be a
very subjective matter, and views can often be based off individuals’ perceptions of
situations.
Mobile Phones
Mobile phones, smartphones, and PDAs have increased among individuals
throughout the world. According to Tamma et al. (2018), “the number of mobile phones
users in the world was expected to surpass 5 billion in 2019” (p. 8). Mobile phones are
used during individuals’ everyday lives for paying bills, taking pictures, and calendar
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appointments. e This has led to individual personal lives being documented within their
phones either internally or externally via social media sites.
The Samsung Galaxy and iPhone are two of the most popular smartphone devices
available in the mobile phone market. These devices come with unique platforms that
usually help users determine which one best fit their needs. Android operating systems
occupy over 80% of mobile devices markets based on 2017 statistics, with iOS second
(Mikhaylov, 2017). This could be because of Android's user-friendly interface that allows
the user to control everything their phone does, unlike its competitor Apple iOS.
Freedom of control in terms of Android and Apple devices tend to play a notable
role when it comes to security and privacy. Security and privacy are two factors that lead
to debates between users of devices and individuals who manufacture the devices along
with forensic examiners in the digital forensic field. Data can be stored on mobile devices
that can become vulnerable to hacking (Au et al., 2017). Mobile devices are becoming
smarter, with every newly updated release model boasting better security and privacy
encryption.
Privacy
Individuals tend to define privacy differently based on what they consider private
or not. Protecting data on smartphones and privacy has been an important topic for many
years. While technology companies pride themselves on protecting their consumers’ data
from law enforcement, this has been debated and questioned. Newman (2012) said law
enforcement has continued to decry that smartphone encryption methods hinder their
investigations, which can potentially lead to national security concerns.
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Smartphones now have a multitude of protection layers to disrupt any
unwarranted access to devices without proper passcodes. While iOS has infrastructure in
place for hierarchical encryption protection, much of it is unused and operation systems
do not extend encryption protections as far as it could (Newman, 2021). According to
Newman (2021),
When an iPhone has been off and boots up, all the data is in a state Apple calls
complete protection. The user must unlock the device before anything else can
really happen, and the device's privacy protections are very high. You could still
be forced to unlock your phone, of course, but existing forensic tools would
have a difficult time pulling any readable data off it. Once you have unlocked
your phone that first time after reboot, though, a lot of data moves into a
different mode—Apple calls it Protected Until First User Authentication, but
researchers often simply call it “After First Unlock. (para. 7)
There is a concern because individuals do not tend to reboot their devices very
often, which means that most devices will be in a state after first unlock more often
than completely protected.
Everything done on a smartphone can lead to some type of privacy concern. For
example, taking a picture leaves geotagging information, which gives out the location
where that picture was taken. Making phone calls or using short messaging services
(SMS) involves cell towers which give locations determining where calls or SMS were
sent from. Using global positioning services (GPS) gives away individuals’ real time
positions along with where they may have been in the past. Wi-fi connections also give
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individual locations away. Different functions mobile smartphones devices offer can
cause security and privacy concerns for users.
Not only can these concerns be exploited by criminals and hackers, but also law
enforcement can use these devices to help them solve criminal cases, which has now
become the norm in criminal investigations. Smartphones are one of the most soughtafter digital pieces of evidence law enforcement looks for when a crime has taken place,
because of all the information they can retrieve from them, without even questioning the
suspected individuals. According to Tamma et al. (2018), modern mobile platforms
contain built-in security features to protect user data and privacy. These built-in security
features continue to be upgraded with each device or software patch released. With each
upgrade, there still lacks specific laws that govern digital forensics, which leaves
investigators to rely on precedent cases and predetermined laws.
Legal Laws
Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment has been debated in courts for decades and will continue
to be debated as interpretation will always be an issue when dealing with individuals'
rights. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) is where the courts originally held
that the Fourth Amendment protection would be triggered whenever the government
invaded a citizen's reasonable expectation of privacy. This case followed the previous
Supreme Court Trespass Doctrine, where they held that trespass onto a defendant’s
property was not enough to warrant Fourth Amendment protection in 1924 (Miraldi,
1977, p. 710).
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The Trespass Doctrine was based on physical contact with an individual and/or
their property. This, however, would need to be expanded on because emerging
technology that law enforcement were beginning to utilize in order to circumvent having
to physically be on someone property to collect evidence.
United States v. New York Telephone Company
United States v. New York Telephone Company 434 U.S. 159 (1977) allowed law
enforcement get court orders facing telephone companies to install pen registers to record
phone numbers dialed on a certain device. The court said that requiring the telephone
companies help law enforcement with pen registers would not affect their business
operations, as they currently use the method for themselves regularly. This is one of the
many cases that the FBI cited in their fight with Apple in 2016.
Kyllo v. United States
Kyllo v. United States 533 U.S. 27 (2001) case revolves around whether the use of
a thermal-imaging device aimed at a private home from a public street to detect relative
amounts of heat within the home constitutes a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment. In simpler terms, the question the case seeked to answer in general was if
the use of technology enhancement tools invaded and/or trespassed on individuals rights
within the Fourth Amendment. The government claimed that use of technology should
not be considered a search since they did not physically access the defendants’ property.
Kyllo, the defendant in the case argued that the government did in fact invade his
Fourth Amendment rights by utilizing invasive technology not readily available to the
public to look inside his dwelling unlawfully. This is not the first time a case like this has
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been heard in front of the U.S. Supreme Court. “Courts have approved warrantless visual
surveillance of a home, see California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213, ruling that visual
observation is no “search” at all, see Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227,
234—235, 239” in the past (Kyllo v United States 533 U.S. (2001)).
Utilizing precedence from the cases mentioned above, the government argued that
they did not in fact invade Kyllo Fourth Amendment rights because they only utilized
visual observation. This, however, was not the stance of the Supreme court almost 15
years later. The Supreme court held that use of advanced technology from a public
location inside a private residence was considered a search within the Fourth Amendment
in therefore unlawfully without a warrant.
This holding however still left a lot of questions on the table regarding advanced
technology. After this case, there still lacked a significant articulation on exactly “when
technology has crossed the line from a new technology, unavailable in law enforcement
searches without a warrant, to existing technology in general public use that courts may
not now consider a search at all under the Fourth Amendment” (Adkins, 2002, p. 245267). This has left room for future cases as technology has and will continue to advance,
as seen in the Riley v. California case where a smartphone now became the technology
being utilized to collect evidence.
Along with mobile phone companies such as Apple and Samsung utilizing
encryption methods to protect their customers' privacy, the fourth amendment also helps
protect citizens from the government (law enforcement) by not allowing them to search
or seize digital evidence without the proper authority. The unlawful search and seizure of
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digital evidence, especially searching has played a major role in national cases regarding
digital evidence. There have been numerous times where law enforcement may have
sought out to search an individual's personal device, however needed that individual to
unlock such device because they either did not have proper authority to search the device
legally using forensic methods and their forensic methods failed to unlock the device.
Research has shown in the past that law enforcement agencies are willing to do
just about anything to retrieve valuable information they believe is located on digital
evidence. For example, a case where the FBI forced an individual to unlock their Apple
iPhone X utilizing face recognition (Brewster, 2018). This as anyone can imagine caused
a lot of outcry from the public as it was seen to be disregarding the individual’s 4th and
5th amendment rights. According to Fred Jennings, a senior associate at Tor Ekeland
Law “the law is not well formed to provide the intuitive protections people think about
when they're using a Face ID unlock,” (Brewster, 2018). Utilizing intrusive methods to
gain access to pertinent information without physically trespassing on individual’s
property has been debated for decades. Cases such as this have come up more and more
often with technology continuing to advance.
Riley v. California
Riley v. California 573 U.S _ (2014) was one of the most notorious Supreme
Court Cases dealing with electronic evidence and privacy. This case also revolves around
the Fourth Amendment and law enforcement authority to perform warrantless searches
on individuals cell phones at the time of an arrest. Riley, the defendant in this case,
accused the San Diego Police Department of violating his privacy rights when handing
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his personal property and technology. The courts were tasked with deciding two different
things within this case:
1. Whether the Fourth Amendment permits police officers to conduct a
warrantless search of the digital contents of an individual cell phone, and
2. If so, under what circumstances do they have this authority (Bensur and
Brokamp, n.d.).
Two of the key factors weighed for this case was the issue of privacy versus
safety. There has been very limited case law dealing with the matter in the digital age
before this case. When cellphones (smartphones) become more and more a part of
individuals lives, the amount of information on these devices are becoming unlimited
access to individuals' livelihoods. Most smartphones nowadays have the same capabilities
of computers and why the authority to search someone's computers only comes with a
warrant, smartphones have not been properly addressed yet concerning the matter. There
have been numerous arguments from groups all around the United States pleading for
action to be taken on the matter, however this case was one of the first times the U.S.
Supreme Court decided to address the issue.
Law enforcement sees issues with having to obtain a warrant when dealing with
smartphones, citing officer safety issues in this case. Per California, smartphones can be
rigged to detonate remotely or explode when a specific action is carried out on the phone
while in the owner’s possession (Bensur and Brokamp, n.d.). This concern has become
very apparent throughout the world with the amount of terrorism that has evolved
“Improvised Explosive Devices'' (IED), i.e., the Boston Marathon Bombing the year prior
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to this case. Another concern for law enforcement is the possibility of individuals being
able to delete valuable information or evidence if they are not able to confiscate the
devices without a warrant. They also argued that the same information that can be found
on smartphones can also be found on pieces of paper, in photographs, in wallets and
purses, there is no difference between them searching that information incident to arrest
(Bensur and Brokamp, n.d.). The only difference law enforcement sees in the evidence is
the form of which it is stored.
After going over all evidence presented during previous trials and cases, the U.S.
Supreme Court held that law enforcement would need a warrant to search individuals'
smartphone search incident to arrest. The following was concluded:
Digital data stored on a cell phone cannot itself be used as a weapon to harm an
arresting officer or to effectuate the arrestee’s escape. Law enforcement officers
remain free to examine the physical aspects of a phone to ensure that it will not be
used as a weapon—say, to determine whether there is a razor blade hidden
between the phone and its case. Once an officer has secured a phone and
eliminated any potential physical threats, however, data on the phone can
endanger no one. (Riley v California, US 537 (2014))
This decision has set a precedent for future cases to come concerning the digital
age and world we live in.
FBI v. Apple
In December 2015, the attack in San Bernardino, CA created a very important
discussion regarding national security and individual’s privacy rights between the FBI
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and Apple. The dispute arose from an application that the FBI filed in a federal
magistrate court in California, looking for assistance in the search of an iPhone that was
seized from the attack in San Bernardino (EPIC, n.d). This device was originally owned
by the San Bernardino Health Department but utilized by the suspect in the 2015 attack.
The FBI had tried to unlock the iPhone 5c device themselves with no luck and reached
out to the National Security Agency (NSA) for assistance, however they too said they
could not access the device.
The application the FBI filed in court asked for Apple to be compelled to create a
backdoor for the device for them to gain access to the data located within it. According to
the San Bernardino District Attorney on the case, “the phone may house a “dormant
cyber pathogen” that threatens the county” (Russell, 2016). The application under the
All-Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, was granted, however Apple pushed back on the
decision, calling it unlawful and unconstitutional. After being granted their order, the FBI
got the documents unsealed and notified the press of its request of Apple to assist with
the case, however Tim Cook, Apple CEO released a letter to his customers stating he
would oppose the order (EPIC, n.d.).
When Apple fought back by filling their own court orders asking to not be
compelled to the previous order because of the precedent it could set, the courts began to
take another look at the issues. During this time, the FBI was still trying to different ways
gain access to the device without Apple helps. They eventually found a third-party
company that was able to gain access to the device and dropped the court order on Apple
for the time being. It has been discussed that the Israeli company Cellebrite help the FBI,
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however the FBI has repeatedly denied this accusation to the public and instead have
utilized hackers to create zero-day vulnerability to bypass its ten-try limitation access.
In January 2020, FBI was once again going to go back to court with Apple over
the December 2019 shooting at the Naval Air Station in Pensacola, FL. Just like the San
Bernardino iPhone access issue, the FBI once again was having problems gaining access
to the suspects device in Pensacola. Apple again fought back stating that “it’s not about
the phones — it’s about a year’s long push by the Department of Justice for broader
government oversight of mobile technology” (Caballero-Reynolds, 2020). This push has
continuously affected the world of digital forensics/mobile forensics.
Digital Forensics
Digital forensics has become one of the most complex sciences within the
forensic field all together. It has branched off too many different fields that all come with
their own complexity to them. When thinking about the field of digital forensics, most
individuals are more aware of computer forensics as this was the biggest aspects of the
digital forensics when it first came about. Computers, however, have become just one
aspect of the field, that now consist of “any devices that store data. “Computers, laptops,
smartphones, thumb drives, memory cards external hard drives are within the ambit of
digital forensics” (Singh & Kent, 2018).
Other pieces of digital evidence that may not be as obvious to some would be
game consoles, fit bits, IoT devices and smart tv’s. All these devices can potentially hold
some type of evidence for a case that could help solve a crime.
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Examiners who work in the field must have special skills sets that they must keep
up to date regularly as things change so frequent. They also must familiarize themselves
with the many tools that are available to them. These tools can consist of Magnet
Forensics, Cellebrite, Oxygen, GrayKey Blackbag and Encase and plenty more.
All these tools serve their purpose in the digital forensic field; however, the most
common tools law enforcement tend to utilize for mobile forensic would be Cellebrite
and GrayKey.
Cellebrite
Cellebrite is one of the most common mobile forensic tools available to digital
forensic examiners. Originally it was created in 1999 for wireless carriers to be able to
transfer data from one cellular device to another for its customers. These companies still
utilize the tool for this method today, while examiners use it for investigations. In 2007
however, the company decided to expand into the digital forensic field by creating the
Universal Forensic Extraction Device (UFED), to help mobile forensics examiners
extract data off devices that were encrypted.
UFED’s can be found in just about all local police stations along with their patrol
cars now days, as it has become the go to method for law enforcement when acquiring
get data from mobile devices. It is a very technology friendly tool that doesn’t call for
individuals to be experts at mobile forensics, as a lot of times they can just plug the
device in and follow the instructions on the device and retrieve the information they are
looking for.
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GrayKey
GrayKey is one of the most sought-after mobile forensics tools created by the
company GrayShift, that is only available to law enforcement and some government
entities. This has called a lot of frustration within the mobile forensic field, as examiners
with private companies would also like to utilize the tool, however, are not afforded the
same opportunities. Defense attorneys run into this issue a lot as they are also not allowed
to utilize the tool but have to defend their client from evidence, they are not completely
sure how it was retrieved. According to GrayShift, “only GrayKey can provide lawful
same-day access to the latest iOS devices in less than one hour” (GrayShift, n.d.).
Figure 1
GrayKey Customer Research
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To a lot of mobile forensic examiners and defense attorneys, not having access to
tools like GrayKey completely limits their investigations, as this tool has the ability to
access a lot of iOS devices that other tools don’t. Mobile phones are an essential piece of
digital evidence and not having access to one of the best forensic tools, limits certain
investigators during investigations.
Digital Evidence
According to the National Institute of Justice (2016), “digital evidence is
information stored or transmitted in binary form that may be relied on in court” (para, 2).
In recent years, more and more crimes have been committed utilizing electronics such as
computer hard drives, personal digital assistants (PDA), flash cards in digital cameras and
smartphones to name a few. These crimes leave behind digital evidence that law
enforcement have begun to use in order to solve these same crimes. Most Law
Enforcement agencies today have specialty units that constantly work and train on how to
gather digital evidence without altering it.
The collection of digital evidence is one of the most crucial steps in an
investigation, as if not collected proper it can potentially affect the data located on the
devices. In the past when computer was the main digital evidence being collected for
investigations, there was only one rule, “pull the plug”. This allowed for the examiners to
ensure no data would be alter, however they did not account for the data that was going to
be lost by just pulling the plug. This eventually led to investigators collecting live digital
evidence. With smartphones, it can sometimes be a little more complex, however.
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With smartphones being minicomputers basically, investigators not only have to
be concerned with alter and/or losing some data. They also have to be cautions of
individuals being able to remotely wiping data off devices along with completely locking
the devices with too many incorrect passcode attempts. One method that is commonly
utilized throughout the digital collection field is “if the phone is on, photograph the
screen and place it in a Faraday bag, aluminum foil or signal-blocking container. This
will prevent a third party from connecting to the phone and being able to alter what's on
it” (Kuzia, 2013).
While digital evidence such as smartphones are sometimes considered the ideal
piece of evidence in criminal cases, just retrieving a mobile phone does not make a
criminal case any easier to solve. There are significant delays when it deals with
conducting forensic on digital evidence. According to Hitchcock, Le-Khac and Scanlon
(2016), “A significant bottleneck during an investigation involving digital evidence is the
time delay from digital evidence being sent to a specialist Technological Crime Unit
(TCU) and the assignment to a forensic analyst to complete the necessary in-depth
analysis and reporting”. These delays can cause an even more significant issue when the
need for the information on the devices are needed for a pertinent investigation. Another
reason behind a lot of delays even after the devices reach the appropriate individuals is
the amount of security located on the device itself.
With mobile phones, especially smartphones, comes the difficulty of getting past
those built-in security measures on the phone to be able to look at potential evidence.
Smartphones are constantly being upgraded with new features and security measures with
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the consumers privacy in mind and no regard to the digital forensic investigators. This in
some cases can become an even bigger issue when presented in court as evidence as
forensic examiners must ensure not to alter any data on the devices during an
investigation. This is where the term mobile forensics plays comes to light.
Encryption
Encryption has been around for decades and has been utilized to protect sensitive
data from individuals who shouldn’t have access to it. According to Loshin and Cobb,
there are three different aspects of encryption to include: the data, the encryption engine,
and the key management (para. 7, 2020). Key management is very important aspects to
encryption because if not managed properly, the key could be easily retrievable, making
the encryption useless.
Technology companies have taking encryption to an entirely different level,
forcing the field digital forensics, especially mobile forensic to stay up to date on the
methods. “Governments and law enforcement officials around the world, particularly in
the Five Eyes (FVEY) intelligence alliance, continue to push for encryption backdoors,
which they claim are necessary in the interests of national safety and security as criminals
and terrorists increasingly communicate via encrypted online services” (Loshin & Cobb,
2020). This is an ongoing battle with technology companies, such as Apple, that has not
seen any real progress and has been described as stalemate in the past by U.S. leaders.
Mobile Forensics
Mobile forensics, while relatively unique, is one of the fastest growing digital
forensics fields being utilized these days. When dealing with criminal investigations, it
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has become very rare to have a case that doesn’t consist of some sort of digital forensics
with smartphones being one of the most useful pieces of evidence to have. With this
evidence comes multiple different processes that should be followed unless the evidence
will be considered tainted in a court of law.
According to Tamma et al. (2018) mobile forensics is one aspect of digital
forensics that can be broken down into three categories to include: seizure/preservation,
acquisition, and examination/analysis.
Each of these categories serve as an important step in the proper handling of
digital evidence when conducting criminal cases. There is also an additional category,
which is often referred to as the reporting phase where the forensic examiner sums up all
their findings in most often a word document. Below shows a limited graph on the
sequence of the different phases of mobile forensics:
Figure 2
Mobile Forensic Investigation Process

Seizure/Preservation
Seizure of digital evidence can be one of the most important parts of a criminal
case. For law enforcement to first be able to collect/seize digital evidence, they must first
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have the proper authority i.e., warrant which can be obtained by a Judge. There are
different types of warrants that can be obtained but the most important part of the warrant
is where it explains exactly what law enforcement can search and seize as defined within
the 4th Amendment. Once digital evidence is seized, it is the responsibility of the
investigators to ensure that it is properly preserved before, during and after the
investigation.
Preservation of evidence plays a significant role especially when concerning
privacy. Digital evidence, especially smartphones can hold an enormous amount of
personal information about the owner of the device and if left in the wrong hands that
information has the potential of being leaked/exposed. According to Englebrecht et al.
(2019) “digital evidence must be stored in such a way that it is secure from unauthorized
access by third parties and retains its original condition”. This can become an issue as the
focus of the criminal investigation should only focus on certain things, however with
digital evidence individuals tend to have to hand over their entire device and not just text
messages or photos stored on the phone. Having to relinquish an entire device gives
investigators the opportunity to acquire everything within the device during what is called
the acquisition of the device, which can be done multiple different days.
Acquisition
The acquisition phase of mobile forensics can be broken down into three different
forensic methods, which all come with a unique advantage and disadvantage. With most
users having some sort of security function enabled on their device, whether it be face
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recognition, pins or passwords, forensics investigators typically must find ways to bypass
these measures without altering any data.
Figure 3
Acquisition Phase

Post-Mortem Forensics is typically used throughout investigations to extract data
off devices. Forensic investigators often prefer to get what is called a physical extraction
as it affords them more data than a logical extraction. According to Krishnan et al.
(2019), physical extraction methods like Hex Dumping, Joint Test Action Group (JTAG),
Chip-Off and Micro Read allow for a more direct access to the raw information stored on
the smartphone device flash memory. This type of access has the potential to take hours
to finish, which the investigator typically has no control over. The investigator also has
no control over if the data extraction completely grabs all the necessary data and this will
not be known until the extraction is completed, as there is no ability to check while the
extraction is taking place. This in turn leaves it up to the actual examination of data to
know if all pertinent data was collected.
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Examination/Analysis
Examining data after a data extraction is completed can be done in a variety of
ways, however this can have its disadvantages. According to Krishnan et al. (2019), there
still lacks any global standardization regarding forensic processes and the only
framework that lists any type of requirements to be met is the “Smartphone Tool
Specifications Standard” developed by NIST. Having standardized guidelines established
would make the digital field more comprehensive to the courts. This can be difficult
however, as with most things’ technology, it is an ever-changing field that is constantly
evolving and forcing examiners to continue to find new ways to conduct forensic.
During the examination stage of a mobile/smartphone, investigators must first
check to ensure that the data collected was not corrupted during the acquisition phase.
This is typically done by making sure there are no blank sectors of data, which is usually
identified by the forensic tool utilized to acquire the data. Investigators also need to
ensure they are conducting their examination of the data with the acquired copy of the
image and not the original.
Depending on the type of investigation the examiner is working on, they tend to
tailor what they look for during the examination. If examiners were to look at every piece
of data located on the phone, it would take them weeks, sometimes months to go through
everything. Forensic tools such as Oxygen have the capability to collect a lot of different
information that examiners tend to look at. This information can include, but is not
limited to Device Information, Contacts, Call Logs (Missed/Outgoing/Incoming Calls),
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Organizer Data (Memos/Tasks/Notes), SMS, MMS, E-Mails, Photos, Videos, Audio and
video files, and Deleted Data (Jones & Winster, 2017)
This phase is where privacy becomes an issue for a lot of individuals. As forensic
examiners, they have access to everything that is within the phone and this is not
comforting for individuals. While examiners may be looking for one thing on a device it
is not uncommon for them to find others incriminating or personal information about the
device owner. It has been said numerous times that smartphones are an extension of
someone's life. According to Nijssen, Schaap and Verheijen (2018), “we rely on our
digital devices for doing our jobs, maintaining friendships, navigating traffic, or relaxing
after work, and our physical and emotional attachment to them has deepened
accordingly”.
This information is not something that individuals would likely like to share with
forensic examiners, however it is information that examiners would find useful. This is
where the corporations such as Apple and Samsung play a significant role in
security/privacy. Apple prides itself on its ability to protect its consumers privacy from
unwanted parties. Apple Inc, (2021) states the follow on their website:
Apple believes privacy is a fundamental human right and has numerous built-in
controls and options that allow users to decide how and when apps use their
information, as well as what information is being used. Your devices are
important to so many parts of your life. What you share from those experiences,
and who you share it with, should be up to you. We design Apple products to

32
protect your privacy and give you control over your information. It’s not always
easy. But that’s the kind of innovation we believe in. (para, 1)
This statement looks to be in line with their reaction in 2016 with the U.S
Government. The FBI requested them to unlock or build a backdoor to the iPhone of the
San Bernardino shooter and they refused. In an open letter to their customers, Cook
(2016) said “The United States government has demanded that Apple take an
unprecedented step which threatens the security of our customers. We oppose this order,
which has implications far beyond the legal case at hand” (para, 1).
With the security measures Apple had in place on that device, forensic examiners
within the FBI, were having a difficult time acquiring the data on the phone and wanted
the company to bypass the security features for them. This would have allowed the
examiners the opportunity to conduct an examination/analysis on the device to help build
a case against the shooter in San Bernardino. Without Apple's help getting into the
device, the FBI worried that there may have been information on the device that would
possibly detail another criminal act being planned.
Apple and the FBI are seemingly at odds again with the technology company
refusing again to create a backdoor for the law enforcement agency to get into the iPhone
of the excused mass shooter in Pensacola, Fl at the Naval Air Station. The United States
Attorney General publicly asked Apple to help with the unlocking of the device, while
Apple declined and instead assembled a team of advisers to defend their encryption
policies as they believe another legal battle with the Department of Justice looms (Hauk,
2020).
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Issues such as these will continue to arise when dealing with digital forensics,
privacy, law enforcement and technology corporations. Technology corporations
continue to expand and upgrade their security features for their consumers; however, this
makes the job of a forensic examiner harder daily. Once a forensic tool is developed to
bypass one security feature, another security feature is developed to withstand that
forensic tool. This is an ongoing battle that appears to have no end in sight and examiners
must continue to if not stay ahead of security measures, or at least be up to date with
them. If not, their reports are going to be filled with failed attempts at acquiring
smartphone data for investigations along with battling technology corporations for help.
Reporting
The report of a digital forensic investigation is one of the most important aspects
of the investigation. This is where the examiner explains all the methods utilized
throughout the process, how they acquired the data and exactly what data was found on
the devices. This report must explain the exact forensically sound investigation methods
used for the information found to be used in a court of law. This can sometimes fall short
of explaining the forensically sound methods used however, when it comes to law
enforcement and their use of the GrayKey tool. As mentioned previously, this tool is not
widely available, and its exact capabilities are kept amongst those who are allowed to
utilize the tool.
Summary
In this chapter, I discussed the Fourth Amendment which is one of the most
important aspect to citizens and the government when it deals with the right to privacy.
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Building off Fourth Amendments foundation of privacy, I looked at previous case law
where the Courts were forced to step in and make decisions concerning the use of
advance technology. Their decision often left room for more discussion because law
enforcement methods continued to advance along with technology and prior law left
room for interpretation on the issue. It was also discussed within this chapter the daily
task and frustrations forensic examiners face while trying to conduct their jobs.
I looked at the different types of digital evidence that can acquired, while also
discussing the tools used to acquire such evidence during investigations. Regarding tools
used, I talked about how the forensic tool GrayKey can only be access by law
enforcement and some government entities. This often can hinder others from conducting
complete investigations or defending their clients in court.
From researched literature utilized within this chapter, it appeared to be a
common theme that forensic examiners were struggling to keep up with the technology
companies regarding encryption and it appears that no one knows how to approach the
issue. These themes are in line with other research studies that utilized the
phenomenology theory to gain insight to participants perceptions. As mentioned by
Miner-Romanoff (2012), Husserl theory can be underutilized when it comes to crime and
this research study seeks to clarify why it can be useful.
Using Walden University Library, Google Scholar and Lexis Nexis, I was able to
find articles, papers, and court documents by using key search terms. These key terms
enabled me to find information regarding struggles forensic examiners are facing. This
study will address that issue via interviews with individuals on this topic.
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Chapter 3: Methodology
Introduction
This chapter includes the methodology that was utilized to understand the
perceptions of mobile forensic investigators concerning, privacy rights, encryptions, and
national security. I will also discuss the methods used to collect and analyzed the data
from the research conducted.
Interviews of participants involve how important they feel privacy and national
security can or cannot coexist together, and if so, the complications involved with this
coexistence. Participants were asked to sign consent forms and sit down for one-on-one
interviews and/or focus groups to discuss the topic. They also filled out outside activity
forms, which is an internal form required by my agency to conduct interviews with
individuals I work with.
Research Design
This study was conducted as a qualitative study, which allowed for perceptions of
mobile forensic investigators regarding privacy of individuals to be explored. Using the
phenomenology theory, this study filled in gaps regarding a subject that had not been
thoroughly discussed. This allowed participants to be able to give their opinions in a
manner that was thoroughly evaluated.
Role of the Researcher
For this case study, I was the sole researcher and data collector. I was responsible
for finding all participants, along with setting up the one-on-one interviews with these
individuals. Along with conducting interviews, I created a list of questions each
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participant was asked and the order they were asked in. This consisted of open-ended
questions that were used throughout the interview. Ensuring that any form of bias on my
part was properly addressed and avoiding objectivity was also my responsibility, as I am
currently a digital forensic examiner and may potentially have to interview individuals I
know.
According to Varga-Dobai (2012), objectivity implies that the researcher can
distance themselves from subjects observed during the process of research while ensuring
delivering questions in a neutral way without influencing participants. Varga-Dobai said
the researcher “enters the research arena with no ax to grind, no theory to prove, and no
predetermined results to support” (p. 1-17).
In order to ensure confirmability throughout the study, participants’ engagement
throughout the study was thoroughly documented to allow for objectivity to be addressed.
Each participant received the same emails, documents, and access to interview
transcriptions throughout the entire process.
Research Questions
The following questions were used:
RQ1: What is the impact of encryption on mobile forensic investigations?
RQ2: When considering national security, what are the perceptions of mobile
forensic investigators concerning privacy rights?
Sampling of Participants
I used the phenomenology theory, and it was imperative that I interviewed
individuals who had working knowledge of the topic. These individuals include former
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law enforcement members, digital forensic examiners, and attorneys in digital forensics.
This selection process is typically called purposive sampling, which is described as
selecting individuals who have experience or qualifications with the phenomenon under
investigation (Creswell, 2005, p. 204). The goal was to interview 10 individuals, as it
became difficult to schedule interviews with individuals who work busy schedules and
lacked free time to participate in interviews. As it became difficult to recruit individuals
within the law enforcement filed, especially from the FBI, I expanded my research to
forensic examiners in general to find available and willing participants.
Data Collection
Sources of data for this study were phone and video interviews during times that
were agreed upon by me and participants who willingly participated in the research study.
The recording device that was used was checked before each interview to ensure it was
working properly. If the recording device was found to not be working properly, a spare
was available. If for any reason the spare recording device malfunctioned, I would take
notes manually by hand, as myself and the participant would potentially not want to
reschedule the interview for a later date. This would ensure the process ran as smoothly
as possible. When conducting these interviews, it was imperative to ensure participants
felt comfortable throughout the entire interview process and research study. According to
Rubin and Rubin (2005), making sure to have a welcoming atmosphere, open dialogue,
not imposing perspectives or opinions during conversations, and maintaining flexibility
in terms of the flow of interviews are very important.
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Interviews started with participants and me going over the informed consent form
that was previously emailed to them. This form outlined reasons for the study, what the
study will be used for, who had access to the study, and how their opinions would be
relayed. Each participant was given the option to maintain complete anonymity to protect
their privacy, as their opinions could have the potential to affect their work lives.
Participants were also once again informed during any point throughout the interview, if
they felt uncomfortable to let me know, and we could discuss whether it would be best
for them to withdraw from the study. After going over the consent form, participants
were given the option to engage in small talk to help open the conversation in a relaxing
manner.
Each interview was expected to last no longer than one hour from start to finish,
including time after for questions and summarizing discussions, which was more than
enough time. This helped ensure that all information collected was correct and there were
no misunderstood questions. During the summary, participants were given the
opportunity to ask questions about the actual study that were interesting to them or came
to their mind during the questioning stage that they did not get a chance to ask.
All interview questions were derived from the main two research questions to
ensure that topics were clearly aligned. Each participant was asked the same questions in
the same order to ensure consistency throughout the study. Any follow-up questions were
based on answers received from participants.
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Reliability and Validity
When considering reliability and validity, individuals tend to connect to the terms
to quantitative studies more than qualitative studies. Validity and reliability are two
factors which any qualitative researcher should be concerned about while designing a
study, analyzing results and judging the quality of the study (Golafshani, 2003; Patton,
2001). An important aspect of reliability and validity is to ensure to incorporate
triangulation and member checking within this research study.
Member checking was completed after every interview to ensure information
interpretation was complete, by doing a quick summarize of what was discussed. This
enabled me to limit the amount time I took from the participants, by not having to reach
back out (unless necessary) after the interviews were completed. As mentioned earlier
within this chapter the participants may have very limited time to participate, so ensuring
to get all information and clarification at the same time is imperative. Triangulation was
accomplished by interviewing two different forensic examiners groups. This will ensure
to keep my professional beliefs of the topic at bay as participants will have different
backgrounds on the topic.
Data Analysis
Data was analyzed by me utilizing narrative analysis. Narrative analysis captures
personal and human dimensions of experience over time and takes account of the
relationship between individual experience and cultural context (WordPress, n.d, para, 1).
Taking in account participants personal experiences and cultural context regarding the
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research topic allowed for the data to be thoroughly comprehended. Ensuring data was
comprehended correctly, recordings from the interviews were transcribed.
Transcription was completed by me to save on time and money, as transcribing
became very costly to get it done professional. This however did make the process a little
slower. “At first glance, it might appear that capturing what is said on paper is a
straightforward task, however even fairly ‘accurate’ ones, can be misleading” (Hepburn
& Bolden, 2017). After the transcribing of the data, the analysis of the transcribes was
thoroughly considered for the most important data to be pulled out utilizing the coding
method.
According to Bazeley (2007), coding is one of several methods of working with
and building knowledge about data; used in conjunction with annotating, memoing,
linking and modeling. Coding can be very complex depending on the data that is being
coded, therefore it is important to completely understand the method being utilized. “Any
researcher who wishes to become proficient at doing qualitative analysis must learn to
code well and easily. The excellence of the research rests in large part on the excellence
of the coding” (Strauss, 1987). In order to accomplish the coding, the Nvivo software was
going to be utilized as it is designed for data is in word form to help with organization,
however I later decided to complete the coding myself without the software. While
member checking during the interview phase should clear up any discrepancies, there
were instances when I had to get more clarification for the participants. Which was
addressed with the individual who was interviewed. If any discrepancies arose during
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other phases of the research study i.e., transcribing, I was prepared to address the matter
by officially hiring professionals.
Ethical Protections
Staying in line with Walden University requirements for research studies
regarding human participant interactions, I obtained approval from the Institutional
Review Board at Walden and from the participants who employers required it. I did end
up interviewing an individual who worked at the same employer as me, however we have
never interacted with each other as our employer has over thousands of workers
worldwide. Being proactive, approval was already granted from my employer to speak
with individuals, with the acknowledgment of paperwork that was to be filled out prior to
any interview. Each participant was required to sign an informed consent (via email) as
mentioned earlier and such form will be thoroughly reviewed with the participants before
the interviews begin.
Participants were only referenced by numbers, and job titles instead names. Also,
their employer’s information was not mentioned within the study. After the research
study was completed, all data is being kept for a minimum of five years within a lock safe
at a location only accessible be myself. After the five years, data will be destroyed
utilizing a sound method i.e., wiping the hard drive or completely degaussing it and
shredding any physical documents that notes were written on.
With the acknowledgment of interviewing an individual that worked for the same
Agency as me, there stood the possibility of conflict of interest that was addressed
appropriately from the beginning. This conflict was addressed by ensuring not to go into
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too much detail of any particular case or situation the examiner may have dealt with,
which alleviated the possibility of any need-to-know information being released within
the study.
Summary
Within this chapter, I discussed the methods on how the research would be
conducted in order to gather the necessary opinions on security and privacy when it deals
with digital forensic. The importance of my role as the researcher and how bias can play
a negative role during the interview process. This also comes into play when deciding on
who will participate within the research study as only a particular group would
comprehend the subject matter. The method of how data was collected and the manner
and how it was analyzed, was also discussed within this chapter to give a better
understanding of the process. In Chapter 4, the results for the research study will be
explained.
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Chapter 4: Results
Introduction
In this chapter, I summarize results acquired from participants interviewed for this
research. Participants were all asked the same questions involving their opinions or
previous and current experience with the topic. Research was conducted by interviewing
10 individuals with digital forensic and specifically mobile forensic experience. These
interviews were conducted via Zoom video chat or Microsoft Teams. Each interview was
held at a convenient time for the participant and lasted between 30 and 60 minutes. After
all interviews were completed, data were transcribed by me to address all relevant
information.
After transcriptions of interviews, summaries were sent to everyone via email.
Participants returned their summaries with necessary changes that needed to be made
along with any additions they wanted added to their interview via member-checking.
After this, I analyzed data for common and uncommon themes.
I also discuss demographics of participants within the study. Participants were
asked specific questions that only related to them. Gender limitations were also
mentioned as it became clear that the study would have more men than women, as
technology careers such digital forensics are commonly dominated by men.
Study Overview
The purpose of this study was to understand the issues mobile forensic
investigators have while trying to conduct their jobs. As smartphones have continued to
advance, encryption has also advanced. With the advancement of encryption methods,
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forensic examiners are constantly being tasked with finding new and innovative ways to
bypass securities features on their devices. This has led to difficult and sometimes failed
attempts, as seen with the FBI in 2016 regarding their efforts to unlock a suspected
shooter’s iPhone device.
In 2014, former director of the FBI James Comey expressed that allowing the
government access to cell phones would enable them to catch not only criminals but also
terrorists (Gu, 2014). The theory behind this was that by not allowing U.S. government
agencies access to devices, no justice could be served in criminal cases. He fought this
stance by indicating that they were not requesting backdoor but rather front door access
to be as transparent with U.S. citizens as possible. This, however, would open
possibilities for criminal hackers to exploit devices also.
Participants’ opinions and experiences are expressed throughout research
interviews to gain a better understanding of mobile forensic examiners’ perceptions of the
issue of encryption. From data that were collected via interviews, mobile forensic
practitioners were split on these issues, with different opinions between civilians and
practitioners. This became even more evident with participants who had previous law
enforcement experience, as they were looking at it from three different perspectives.
Personal and Organizational Influences
During the time I began to collect my data, there were different social and justice
issues going on within the U.S. centered around law enforcement. During a world
pandemic, law enforcement departments were continuously scrutinized by social and
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justice groups for the way they handled situations. I believe this could have played a role
in how participants within this study addressed certain questions during interviews.
There were multiple times throughout interviews when social justice issues taking
place in the U.S. were brought up as examples. This was evident when asking
participants if they felt technology companies helping law enforcement would be seen as
a privacy concern. Some participants used examples involving how law enforcement is
viewed as untrustworthy as well as how technology companies’ ability protect
individuals’ privacy rights.
Data Analysis and Collection Procedures
Information provided throughout interviews, was the basis of data collected for
the study. All participants either had some digital forensics knowledge or were digital
forensic examiners themselves, with some knowledge and/or experience with mobile
forensics. There were 10 participants coming from either the educational, government, or
practitioner industries, with some law enforcement experience.
Data were collected via Zoom and Microsoft Teams for interviews, as personal
interviews were not feasible during the COVID-19 pandemic. Participants were giving
multiple options to select from regarding day and time of interviews. Interviews were
held at least once a week, depending on scheduling, as multiple interviews were
rescheduled due to unforeseen circumstances. In total, it took about 5 months to find
participants, receive their consent, schedule and conduct interviews, and complete
member checks.
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Originally, I had planned on doing one-on-one face to face interviews along with
one focus group. This plan, however, had to be adjusted as the COVID-19 pandemic
made it difficult to interview individuals in person and almost impossible to conduct a
focus group. Video interviews seemed the best way to collect my data and keep everyone
safe, and I cancelled the focus group altogether.
Participants were all asked the same questions in the exact same order, with some
follow-up questions based on their answers. These answers were then analyzed for
common or uncommon themes.
After completion of interviews, all participants were given the opportunity to ask
any additional questions they may have had concerning the study. If there were no
additional questions, I explained next steps, which were that I would write up a summary
of interviews and send them via email. This gave each participant the opportunity to look
over their summaries and make any necessary changes. After making the changes, they
emailed me back the updated summary.
With all summaries updated, I proceeded to look over them and compare any
similarities that arose from interviews to gain a better understanding of how much
privacy and encryption are a cause for concern with examiners. To complete this, I
created three bins for RQ1: Encryption Problematic, Encryption not an Issue and
Indifference. Out of the 10 participants, only one felt as if encryption was not an issue,
while seven felt it was problematic, and two were indifferent about it. I then created two
bins based off RQ2 concerning national security and privacy concerns: Overuse of
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National Security and Proper Use of National Security. Two participants felt indifferent
about overuse of national security.
It became very clear early on after looking over summaries that there were many
similar opinions, with some examiners using the same phrases.
There were also differences amongst the participants as some believed that law
enforcement has depended on digital evidence to much lately. This opinion mostly came
from participants who had some experience working in law enforcement. They typically
referenced that before digital forensics became so popular, investigators in law
enforcement knocked on doors and pulled surveillance tapes to solve crimes and this
method worked just fine back then, cases were still solved.
Participant Demographics
For this research study, participants were asked to provide their demographic
information such as: gender, age range and years in occupation (see Table 1).
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Table 1
Demographic Group Information
Participants

Gender

Age range

Years in occupation

1

Female

40-50

10

2

Male

40-50

3

3

Male

30-40

4

4

Male

40-50

15

5

Male

50-60

23

6

Male

30-40

5

7

Male

20-30

8

8

Female

30-40

8

9

Male

40-50

18

10

Male

30-40

11

As seen in Table 1, participants had a very wide variety in years worked in the
field. Some examiners were new to the field, while others have been in the filed for
almost as long as it has existed. The age range tended to lean more towards the 40-50
range, with only one individual being under 30 at the time of the interview. I believe with
the variety of differences in years in the field and age, I was able to grasp a good
understanding of how individuals feel about the state of mobile forensics.
There was also a clear lopsidedness when it came to gender and this study, as I
was able to interview more men than women. The technology field tend to be dominated
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by males, with women being like a needle in haystack. The figure below shows how the
biggest technology companies in the United States, not only lack women in the
organizations, but women in technology.
Figure 4
GAFAM: Women Still Underrepresented in Tech

With the lack of women in the technology field, I went into this study realizing
that recruiting mobile forensic examiners would be difficult. I didn’t account for the lack
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of women however, and only realized this issue once I began finding willing participants
that were majority men.
Interview Data
Participant 1
Participant 1 was a practitioner/educator within the field currently and has been
doing the digital/mobile forensic for 10 years.
She stated that encryption on mobile devices is not that much of a concern as
many people may believe. Examiners have the full device in their possession
during an investigation, which hold the keys on them. Encryption can still be a
technically challenge those examiners must consistently overcome and have
overcame for the past decade by thinking outside the box. It is a game of cat and
mouse, that is to be expected in the technical field. Protecting privacy and
allowing for legal acquisitions of content should be a partnership.
The bigger concern would be wipe capabilities that technology these days have.
Participant 2
Participant 2 worked for the government as a practitioner in the field and has been
doing digital/mobile forensic for 3 years.
Regarding whether or not law enforcement should be able to search devices
search incident to arrest, the participant had the follow to say:
This depends on why the individual was original stopped. There was an incident
close to where I reside, that law enforcement pulled over a vehicle and the
occupant of the vehicle had committed a murder and was arrested. If allowed to
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go through the individual’s device the officers could have possible retrieved
evidence of the murder. While I do not believe that law enforcement should be
allowed to go through everyone’s device without probable cause, there is times I
feel as if they should be allowed.
The participant also believed that current, Apple iOS devices are more difficult to
gain access to then Googles, Android devices. Stating that Apple’s source is more
protected then.
Participant 3
Participant 3 worked for the government as a practitioner in the field and has been
doing digital forensic for 10 years and mobile forensic for 4 years. He has taking multiple
courses regarding mobile forensic to include a chip off course.
He believed that technology companies’ encryption methods absolutely hinder
mobile forensics. For example, with the iPhone version 4 and up, it’s almost impossible
to get a physical capture of it. While you can jailbreak or root an Android device to
obtain a physical dump, doing so also mean you are altering evidence, which in turns
complicates things. He noted the following regarding the overall issues tech companies
and law enforcement have:
At the end of the day, there needs to be something done, some type of
communication between mobile forensic examiners and tech companies regarding
working to together. There should be clear an understanding between both.
Companies such as Apple should be held accountable for not wanting to work
with law enforcement, especially when there is an incident where there is a loss of
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life. The news and media also play a role in such situations, as they often relay the
message to the public that law enforcement is trying to access private information
from devices, when in reality they are only trying to take preventative measures to
stop incidents such as San Bernardino.
Participant 4
Participant 4 worked for the government as a practitioner in the field and has been
doing digital/mobile forensic for 15 years. He noted the following:
Apple devices tend to be more difficult to access for mobile forensic examiners
than Android right now regarding encryption methods. Apples are narrower
targets, unlike Android devices. Android might have the similar base OS, but the
implementation may be different, and examiners may just get lucky utilizing a
random technique, unlike Apple devices which are better put together. … At the
end of the day, this will be a losing battle for both sides, because if law
enforcement does get technology companies to work with them, technology
companies are going to provide an encrypted blob that law enforcement is still
going to have issues with decrypting. As a private citizen, I have no issues with
this because the government shouldn’t be allowed to just access my information
when they want to.
Participant 5
Participant 5 has worked in the digital forensic field for over 23 years and is a
certified mobile forensic instructor. He has experience with teaching mobile forensic to
law enforcement and government individuals. He noted the following:

53
Regarding tech companies helping or not helping law enforcement access
smartphones, speaking from a private citizen perspective, tech companies have a
duty to provide its consumers with secure devices that do not have backdoors that
the government would be able to access. However, as a retired law enforcement
officer, I believe tech companies should help with accessing smartphones.
Overall, I see privacy as a big concern with big tech, as it’s being comprised for
marketing purposes. … It would be a privacy concern for citizens if technology
companies freely help law enforcement with their forensic investigations. Citizens
have an expectation of privacy, and their personal data should be secured.
Individuals are getting so attached to their smartphones that they are becoming an
extension to themselves. I believe law enforcement is utilizing smartphones as an
easy way of conducting investigations, instead of getting out there and
investigating crimes now days. Before smartphones existed, crimes were being
committed and solved, therefore they should still be able to solve crimes today
without invading individuals’ privacy by accessing their smartphones.
Participant 6
Participant 6 is an attorney for the local public defender office, who works closely
with the mobile forensic examiners. He also has experience with testifying in court
regarding mobile forensic. He noted the following:
Technology companies should never help build a backdoor into encryption for
law enforcement or anyone else, because it would be a terrible precedent to set.
Law enforcement has failed to show how that exploit wouldn’t put the consumers
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of that product at risk from others trying to exploit that same vulnerability. If you
intentionally put in a backdoor, other people who you didn’t intend on walking
through will walk through it as well. … Technology companies helping law
enforcement during investigations will be a privacy concern, especially when
considering exactly what the technology companies are doing to assist. I feel
citizen have less of an argument when thinking about privacy when it comes to
social media such as Facebook. It would be naive to believe that such companies
are not going to turn over personal information to law enforcement if they have a
lawful warrant. … My concern is that technology companies are less willing to
challenge law enforcement compared to other departments. Attorneys can’t just
subpoena information from companies like Facebook, Google etc... they are
prevented by a Federal Law called Stored Communications Act (18 U.S.C. §§
2701–2712). It is antiquated law that has been used to prevent defense attorneys
(and anyone who isn’t law enforcement) from being able to gain access to or
copies of social media data/records, emails, etc. Also, even when requesting
information attorneys are legally allowed to have, those same companies will
fight tooth and nail to not provide such information but will bend over backwards
for law enforcement. There is a little bit of imbalance when it comes to who
certain companies are more willing to help.
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Participant 7
Participant 7 is a digital forensic examiner for a local/state defenders office, who
has 6 years’ experience with mobile forensics. He noted the following regarding
technology companies helping law enforcement:
Coming from an examiner perspective I think it would be a privacy concern for
the public especially for individuals who are technology educated. For example, if
Apple decides they are going to help law enforcement 100% of the time and
Google decide they are going to help on a case-by-case situation, most people will
decide to utilize Google, since they are working harder to protect its consumers
privacy rights. For your everyday person, who is not that aware of how
technology works, I still think it would be a privacy concern also. For example,
no one wants Facebook giving out all their information, so why would we want a
phone manufacturer to do the same thing.
In regard to the 4th amendment applying to individuals’ personal devices, participant 7
expressed the following:
The 4th amendment should apply to individual’s personal media devices just the
same as it does to dwelling or person. Smartphones have become part of who
individuals are now and just about everyone has one. Law enforcement shouldn’t
be able to search a device without the proper authority, just as if they wanted to
search someone’s dwelling.
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Participant 8
Participant 8 is also a digital forensic examiner for a local/state defenders office,
who has 8 years’ experience with mobile forensics. She noted the following:
Technology companies’ encryption methods can hinder mobile forensic
investigations as seen with the San Bernardino incident, where the FBI felt they
needed Apples help but ultimately utilized a third-party company to gain access to
the iPhone. There are two main companies (GrayShift and Cellebrite) that work to
circumvent encryption methods on iPhones, but they are not perfect and don’t
work on every model of every phone. Technology companies not helping is not a
complete roadblock, but there are times where examiners can help a dead end and
not be able to access a device and retrieve the data from it.
He had this to say when asking about a solution to the issues between law enforcement
and mobile forensic examiners:
I do not believe tech companies should just blindly help law enforcement without
a lawful court order telling them to. The same way law enforcement uses warrants
to make companies like Apple turn over individuals iCloud backups, there should
be no difference in them when trying to get access to the actual devices.
Participant 9
Participant 9 has over 18 years of experience with not only digital forensics, but
mobile forensics as well. He conducted mobile for forensics while working in law
enforcement and is very familiar with the field from when it was just beginning to expand
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beyond just computer forensics. Regarding the state of mobile forensics today and
privacy he stated the following:
I think it would be a privacy concern for the public. While I think law
enforcement should be able to utilize tools at their disposal if used legally, I don’t
think the government should be able to tell any of the big tech companies that
they have to give them encryption keys to access their devices. There are plenty
of examples where the government has not handled their access to data well, they
have been breached time and time again. They do not show good cyber hygiene,
so why would we trust them with the ability to just reach into anyone device.
Once that backdoor is created and is breached by China, Iran, or Russia, they now
have that ability to access those devices as well. It is a tough situation and there is
not an easy answer.
He also believed the following regarding limiting forensic tools from the private
sector:
The issue I have with the limited access to this tool is that law enforcement is
utilizing a tool that no one else has access to and no one can articulate how the
tool works, no one can articulate whether it is actually injecting something into
that device for it to work correctly. There is not much worse you can do to
someone then prosecute them, take away their civil rights and then say, we got all
this information about you that we are going to use against you in court, but your
defense team or defense experts cannot get access to that, and we can’t tell them
how we did it. I do not think that’s fair, nor do I think that is the intent of our
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constitution when it comes to the ability to present a defense. I would understand
more if it was an intelligence specific tool.
Participant 10
Participant 10 has conducting mobile forensics for 11 years, with focus on iOS
devices. They have taken multiple courses on the topic and is considered a senior
examiner at their organization.
When asked specifically about whether encryption on smartphones can hinder
investigations, he had the following to say:
Encryption has been around for some time now and has only gotten better on
smartphones. It can hinder an investigation, because it makes it 10 times harder to
access devices, while back in the day it was basically plug and play. Now days,
you must bypass so many security measures that when examiners are finally able
to access the data on the device it may be too late for the investigation.
When questioned about privacy and whether technology companies should work with
law enforcement, he said the following:
Law enforcement clearly has a job to do and anything to help them complete the
job is great. I, however, do believe that forcing technology companies to help law
enforcement with their investigations may be stepping over the line. If technology
companies decided they wanted to help law enforcement, then great, but I think it
should be the technology companies’ decision and not the governments.
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Themes by Interview Question
Interview Question 1
Are you familiar with the 2016 Supreme Court case Apple v. FBI?
All interviewees were familiar with the 2016 Supreme Court case FBI v. Apple in
some sort of way. While they all had different understanding or knowledge of the situation
and how it related to the San Bernardino incident, the concept of the situation was able to
be related to the research study.
Interview Question 2
With the FBI dropping the case, what is your take on tech companies helping or
not helping law enforcement in such cases?
Most interviewees felt almost the same regarding this question, while their
reasonings may have been a little different. Majority felt as if technology companies had
some type of duty to help law enforcement, they did not think it they should blindly help
them whenever asked to without proper reasoning.
Interview Question 3
Do you believe that tech companies encryption methods, hinder mobile forensic
investigations?
Again, most interviewees felt as if technology companies’ encryption methods do
hinder mobile forensic investigations, some felt it was not a complete roadblock. A
couple also felt as this is not even the biggest issues forensic examiners have to be
concerned about.
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Interview Question 4
What are your thoughts when considering law enforcement conducting mobile
forensic examinations concerning encrypted smartphones?
This question was a very compound question as it was elaborated into utilizing
biometrics to unlock devices and deceased individuals right to privacy. All felt that law
enforcement should obtain a warrant before being able to access individuals’
smartphones, including using biometrics. The divide regarding this amongst the
interviewees came when considering individuals who were already deceased.
Most seemed undecided on if they thought law enforcement should be able to use
biometrics to unlock smartphones if the individual was deceased. The question of legality
came up, with most not knowing what the legal guidelines where regarding deceased
individual’s privacy rights on their mobile devices and what the courts have to say on the
matter.
Interview Question 5
In your opinion, do you believe that if tech companies were to help during
investigations, it would be a privacy concern for the public?
Some felt as if this would be of some concern to the public but was not totaling
against it happening. They believed that depending on the situation, some individuals
would not mind technology companies helping during investigations, however they did
not think it should be a normal thing for every case.
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Interview Question 6
Regarding social media and privacy, do you think as individuals we give our own
privacy away?
Everyone agreed that when it comes to social media and privacy, individuals
completely give away so form of their privacy. There were some that felt if individual
took an additional step to make their social media accounts private, then they could
expect some type of privacy, but not complete from investigations.
Interview Question 7
Do you think national security and privacy can collide with each other?
All felt that national security and privacy can collide with each other, while some
felt it collide daily, hence the United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court and
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act being created. It was a common theme amongst
the participants that law enforcement can sometimes utilize national security as a crutch.
Most felt like national security laws were too broad and needed to be looked at again.
Interview Question 8
Are you familiar with the verbiage used within the 4th amendment? If so, can you
explain what it means to you?
With a little clarification for some, the 4th amendment was understood and
explained how it correlated to this research study.
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Interview Question 9
With the 4th amendment protecting individuals from unreasonable search and
seizures, what are your thoughts when it comes to individual’s personal media
equipment?
All agreed that individual’s personal media equipment should apply to the 4th
amendment with no issues. The key theme within this response was that personal media
equipment now days hold a lot of personal information on them, and they should be
treated the same as if law enforcement wanted to search an individual private dwelling.
Meaning law enforcement should not have unlimited access to individual’s personal
media devices.
Interview Question 10
What is your opinion regarding the forensic tool GrayKey only being available to
law enforcement?
All participants had very strong opinions against this tool being limited to certain
individuals. They all felt as if there was no logical reason to have a limit tool when other
tools are available to everyone. In their opinions, they felt as if it gave law enforcement
an edge that others did not get in the court of law.
Interview Question 11
What is your overall opinion regarding a solution for the issues the FBI and
Apple continues to face with each other? Should the courts step in or should law
enforcement and technology companies figure out a solution on their own?
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This was a very split question amongst the interviewees. Some felt that they did
not see how the courts would be able to help the situation, while other felt that their
needed to be more rulings on the situation. All felt that law enforcement and technology
companies would not be able to come to a comprise, as they both had different agendas in
the matter. They also mentioned that there would be no clear resolution with this issue no
time soon.
Themes by Research Question
This study consisted of two research questions:
RQ1: What is the impact of encryption on mobile forensic investigations?
RQ2: When considering national security, what are the perceptions of mobile forensic
investigators concerning privacy rights?
This section will summarize the study’s themes in accordance with the research questions
presented.
RQ1
Most participants within the study agreed that the encryption methods on devices
affected criminal investigations in different ways. While there was discussion that this
was not as big as concern as many may believe. With technology companies constantly
coming up with new ways to encrypt their devices to protect the user’s privacy, it can
sometimes delay mobile forensic examiners investigations. Even with law enforcement
having special tools that helps circumvent most devices encryption methods, this still
sometimes is not enough for the newer devices, as these tools only work on after they
have been introduced to the encryption before.
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RQ2
Participants all seemed to come to a common ideology, that when it comes to
national security, privacy should potential be altered to a degree. While most didn’t mind
their privacy being invaded, they only agreed with it if the proper channels were
followed, i.e., going through the court system.
Privacy was very important to all participants, but so was national security. Some
agreed that technology companies should in fact work with mobile forensic examiners on
certain cases, however they did not think they should be forced to by the government.
One thing that was very common and obvious throughout all the participants interviews
was that there needed to be some checks and balances in place when considering privacy.
There also needed to be limitations on how law enforcement utilized national security
concerns to circumvent individual’s privacy rights during investigations.
Summary
In this chapter, I discussed the results of a phenomenology-based theory regarding
mobile forensics and the perception of privacy. Ten individuals from backgrounds
ranging from educators to actual practitioners, were afforded the opportunity to give their
opinions on mobile forensics and advancing encryption methods by technology
companies. Opinions were transcribed and then analyzed for common themes to collect a
cohesive conclusion on the data collected.
The interviewed individuals seem to struggle with looking at it from a practitioner
perspective and private citizen as their answer were carefully considered. While they all
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would like to make life easier for mobile forensics examiners in the field, they also did
not want to just give up their privacy rights all together as private citizens.
They tended to agree that something needed to be done, but exactly what, was a
very complex issue, as it would take potentially years to come to a full understanding and
agreeance with both technology companies and mobile forensic examiners. As multiple
participants put it during their interview, it is just a game of cat and mouse at this point,
and no one has a solution to make everyone satisfied. In chapter 5, I will discuss future
research that can be conducted along with personal reflections and interpretations of my
results.
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Chapter 5: Conclusions and Recommendations
Introduction
In this chapter, I discuss the results of this qualitative research study to understand
effects technology companies’ encryption methods have on criminal investigations. I also
discuss privacy concerns when considering national security. Questions have been raised
in the Department of Justice and amongst technology companies, with there being no
clear solution on how to resolve them.
There were 10 individuals who were interviewed, and interviews were structured
similarly, with few differences in terms of follow-up questions based off responses that
were given to me. These individuals were government workers, educators, and
practitioners. With the interview pool being limited, I decided to correlate common
themes myself instead of using software.
Results Summary
This study involved exploring a very rare topic that is not often discussed unless
something significant happens in the U.S. Participants within this study all agreed that
this was an interesting and important topic that has not been clearly addressed. They felt
as if governments’ demand for technology companies were excessive. Privacy was one
the biggest concerns participants had when it came to law enforcement requesting help
from technology companies. They believed privacy was important to citizens; however, it
is hindered when individuals decide to use social media.
National security was thought to be used too broadly from a law enforcement
perspective and should not be used to gain access to individuals’ personal media devices.
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Participants felt as if the only way law enforcement should be able to gain access to
devices is if they went through proper channels such as court orders or consent from the
individuals themselves. It was also noted that while law enforcement claims to not be
able to access many devices, that is not completely the truth.
They also believed that law enforcement was not honest about data they had
access to without getting into devices. Technology companies often comply with court
orders to hand over data from their consumers, such as iCloud data on Apple devices.
Such data can include mail and text messages. This is not sufficient for law enforcement,
however, because this data can still be encrypted, which can leave law enforcement with
the same issue as before.
Findings
Recruitment of participants was done via social media sites or LinkedIn in
addition to my prior knowledge of them working in the field. This ensured that
participants were qualified to speak on the intended topic and comprehended questions
being asked during interviews. Based off interviews with participants, I believe that
research study addresses an ongoing issue that has not been properly addressed.
The results of the research study confirmed that participants all thought there was
an underlying issue with privacy, encryption, and national security, however none had a
clear solution on how to address their concerns. I believe this needs to continue to be
researched from different perspectives as I only looked at it from mobile forensic
examiners’ perspectives, which in many cases has limitations.
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Limitations
One of the primary limitations of this study involved the small sample size.
Participants in this study needed to have knowledge of not only digital but also mobile
forensics as well. With only 10 participants, this limited the number of diverse opinions
needed to understand how significant the issue is. This study was also very lopsided in
terms of gender, as the technology field is heavily saturated with men. While this was not
a factor according to examiners, I think this can lead to bias, as the study was completed
with a 80/20 split between genders.
Social Change
Timing of such a study is imperative to current situations involving technology
companies and the U.S. government. With the increase in domestic terrorism in the U.S.,
this issue is going to become even more relevant. With individuals using their
smartphones for everyday life, these devices are going to become a focal point in
criminal cases in more. Technology companies and forensic examiners are often going to
be at odds and will eventually have to figure out ways to work together for the greater
good of everyone involved.
Social change can be affected by this study in different ways. Enhancing
communication between technology companies and mobile forensic examiners when it
relates to encryption methods would help in terms of understanding their stances.
Encryption methods on smartphone devices will continue to advance as criminals
continue to find ways around them.
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As technology continues to advance along with encryption methods, I would hope
this research study could begin the deep conversations needed between the mobile
forensic examiners and technology companies. Using an interpretivist approach, there
could be an understanding of both sides. However, until courts decide to address the
issue, there will be no clear understanding between technology companies and law
enforcement agencies when dealing with privacy.
Recommendations
This qualitative research study was conducted with data from different
demographic groups. Other research studies can be conducted involving general public
opinions of the matter involving individuals who may have limited experience or
knowledge concerning encryption issues. Also, interviewing individuals from technology
companies would lead to different perspectives on the topic.
Another option would be to conduct a quantitative study regarding the topic with
a much larger participant pool including individuals all over the U.S. The study can be
conducted to gather the opinions of the general public and mobile forensic examiners to
get a better understanding on how much privacy means to both.
Personal Reflections
Conducting this study allowed me to reflect on a topic that is emerging. Mobile
forensics are constantly changing and forcing technology companies to continue to think
how to protect its consumers. When conducting this study, I was at the time entering into
the field of digital forensics for the government. Being so new to the field afforded me
the opportunity to address different angles and views from different examiners. I believe I
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was able to understand a multitude of different perspectives no matter where examiners
where currently working.
I was able to gain a significant amount of knowledge of the field by interviewing
individuals from different backgrounds. I identified certain themes that came about based
on where individuals may have worked or currently worked. While timing began to be an
issue with interviewing law enforcement, speaking with prior individuals who have
worked in law enforcement was just as beneficial because I believed their perspectives on
current issues is very important to the topic. The government and private sectors must
figure out how to coexist in the data protection realm. If not, this issue will be magnified.
Conclusion
Digital forensics and especially mobile forensics is a field that is getting more
complex. Encryption will continue to become more advanced as technology companies
seek to find ways to continue to protect their consumers’ sensitive data. Eventually a
compromise is going to have to happen, whether it comes from the courts or the
organizations themselves.
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Appendix A: Letter of Invitation
Greetings,
I hope this note finds you well.
I am currently a student at Walden University in the PhD program, working on
my Dissertation Research Study. This research study will discuss national security,
privacy and mobile forensics examinations. I am currently looking for volunteers willing
to be interviewed who have at least one (1) year of experience as a Mobile Forensic
Examiner. Participation in this study will be completely voluntarily.
This will include completing an Informed Consent statement (I’ll e-mail this to
you); and allowing me to interview you by phone, zoom or in person. The whole
interview should take no more than 90 minutes of your time.
Please let me know if you would like to participate. Please let me know if
you might be interested in participating and I will send you out the consent form which
includes the full details about the study. I attend to start this process by 10/28/2020 and
finish all interviews by 11/15/2020.
You can contact me by phone 224-627-8474, and/or e-mail
charlesa.young@waldenu.edu if you have any questions.
v/r
Charlesa Young
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Appendix B: Interview Questions
1. Are you familiar with the 2016 Supreme Court case Apple v. FBI?
2. With the FBI dropping the case, what is your take on tech companies helping or
not helping law enforcement in such cases?
3. Do you believe that tech companies encryption methods, hinder mobile forensic
investigations?
4. What are your thoughts when considering law enforcement conducting mobile
forensic examinations concerning encrypted smartphones?
5. In your opinion, do you believe that if tech companies were to help during
investigations, it would be a privacy concern for the public?
6. Regarding social media and privacy, do you think as individuals we give our own
privacy away?
7. Do you think national security and privacy can collide with each other?
8. Are you familiar with the verbiage used within the 4th amendment? If so, can you
explain what it means to you?
9. With the 4th amendment protecting individuals from unreasonable search and
seizures, what are your thoughts when it comes to individual’s personal media
equipment?
10. What is your opinion regarding the forensic tool GrayKey only being available to
law enforcement?
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11. What is your overall opinion regarding a solution for the issues the FBI and Apple
continues to face with each other? Should the courts step in or should law
enforcement and technology companies figure out a solution on their own?

